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This dissertation's focus is control systems controlled by multiple controllers, each having 
its own objective function.  The control of such systems is important in many practical applications 
such as economic systems, the smart grid, military systems, robotic systems, and others. To reap 
the benefits of feedback, we consider and discuss the advantages of implementing both the Nash 
and the Leader-Follower Stackelberg controls in a closed-loop form. However, closed-loop 
controls require continuous measurements of the system’s state vector, which may be expensive 
or even impossible in many cases. As an alternative, we consider a sampled closed -loop 
implementation. Such an implementation requires only the state vector measurements at pre-
specified instants of time and hence is much more practical and cost-effective compared to the 
continuous closed-loop implementation. The necessary conditions for existence of such controls 
are derived for the general linear-quadratic system, and the solutions developed for the Nash and 
Stackelberg controls in detail for the scalar case. 
To illustrate the results, an example of a control system with two controllers and state 
measurements available at integer multiples of 10% of the total control interval is presented.  While 
both Nash and Stackelberg are important approaches to develop the controls, we then considered 
the advantages of the Leader-Follower Stackelberg strategy. This strategy is appropriate for control 
systems controlled by two independent controllers whose roles and objectives in terms of the 
system's performance and implementation of the controls are generally different. In such systems, 
one controller has an advantage over the other in that it has the capability of designing and 
implementing its control first, before the other controller. With such a control hierarchy, this 
controller is designated as the leader while the other is the follower. To take advantage of its 
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primary role, the leader's control is designed by anticipating and considering the follower’s control. 
The follower becomes the sole controller in the system after the leader’s control has been 
implemented. In this study, we describe such systems and derive in detail the controls of both the 
leader and follower. In systems where the roles of leader and follower are negotiated, it is important 
to consider each controller's leadership property. This property considers the question for each 
controller as to whether it is preferable to be a leader and let the other controller be a follower or 
be a follower and let the other controller be the leader. In this dissertation, we try to answer this 
question by considering two models, one static and the other dynamic, and illustrating the results 
with an example in each case. The final chapter of the dissertation considers an application in 
microeconomics. We consider a dynamic duopoly problem, and we derive the necessary 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation considers the important properties and applications of multi-controller 
multi-objective systems. These systems fall in the general framework of differential non-
cooperative non-zero-sum systems. In this chapter, we review these systems' general background, 
which will be important for the remaining chapters of this dissertation. 
Many control engineering, economic, biological, and social science applications can be 
represented and modeled by simple ordinary differential equations. These control systems have 
been extensively studied for the past several decades [1-10]. In these systems, state variables are 
represented by functions of time and affected by the input parameters and if any external signals, 
such as disturbance signals. One of the main demands of such systems is to be stable because the 
output changes are bounded as the inputs are bounded. From another view, for stable or stabilized 
systems, some systems need to have better behaviors in the time domain. Examples of such 
enhancing systems characteristics include fast-reaching to steady-state and decreasing or 
eliminating the overshooting. The classical control theory tries to solve such a problem for single-
input-single-output. However, for more general systems with higher-order, the problem is more 
complex. The use of the optimization theory to solve such systems with constructing the desired 
characteristics with efficient control signal by mathematically represent what is known as 




Arising from the systems discussed above are have a single input, and single output and 
system are controlled by only one controller. Classical and advanced control approaches can 
design this controller; the controller is designed by applying optimal control theory tools. 
However, the systems with single input are well defined for such the principle of optimality, and 
it is clear and straight forward for many applications. For example, tools are applied for designing 
a closed-loop controller for linear systems and single quadratic objective function, which is well-
known as LQ systems. On the other hand, many applications cannot be controlled by one 
controller. Thus, no one of the controllers can govern the system's behavior by itself, and neither 
can be the only minimizer for its objective. In other words, the controller must consider the other 
controllers’ syntheses over the time horizon, finite or infinite. The latter makes the problem more 
complex for such systems, i.e., the multiple controllers with multiple objectives, even for the 
simple open-loop systems. The application of the principle of optimality is not clear in these 
systems. However, such systems' design is strategic and based on the method in which  all 
controllers have committed. From focusing on the work done in this research dissertation, these 
strategies (or solutions) could be done simultaneously or in a hierarchical approach. The next 
sections will consider the optimal control problem framework and the multiple -controller 
framework as well. 
1.1 Single-Controller with Single objective problems (Optimal control problems): 
This problem is based on the fact that there is one controller that governs the system’s dynamics, 
and thus this controller will be the optimizer (usually the minimizer) for its objective function. 
Thus, choosing a controller should result in the best value for its objective, in the sense its value 
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is the lowest value among all the other possible controller choices.  In mathematical representation, 
the optimal control problems for the ordinary differential equation, such as the system’s states , 
evolving over time-horizon ,  
ft  can be finite or infinite.  
The state differential equation is  
( ) ( , ( ), ( ))         (0) , [ , ]o o fx t f t x t u t x x t t t= =                           (1.1) 
 
If the controller is chosen from the admissible control strategy, i.e. ( )u t  . In the open-loop 
design, the controller synthesis provided the initial state values 
ox . For a closed-loop design 
approach, continuous information ( )x t   has to be available at each instance of time. For both open/ 
closed-loop approaches, the designed controller role as the minimizer for its objective functions: 






J S t x t L x u d   = +                                       (1.2) 
 
Where the ( , ( ))f fS t x t  is the terminal cost and the L  is the local ( or called running) cost. 
Many approaches have been invested in finding solutions, control designs, and optimal control 
problems. The next section includes a background introduction for the multi-controller multi-
objective systems framework based on the two main approaches: Nash and leader-follower 
Stackelberg approaches.  
1.2 Control Systems with Multi-Controller with Multi-Objectives  
Control systems whose state variables are controlled by two or more independent 
controllers, each trying to optimize the system performance based on its own criterion , occur in 
many applications such as in transportation systems [11-17], robotics [18-26], biomedical systems 
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[27-36], economic systems [37-47], power systems [48-59], smart energy buildings [60-65], 
military systems [66-71], and many other applications for in networks. The applications example 
of such network systems is unmanned underwater vehicles and satellites[72-76] in different 
context. In work in [72] focuses on team cooperation, namely consensus, for both leaderless (LL) 
and modified leader-follower (MLF) architectures. The recent papers are application of multiple-
controller on cyber-physical systems [77-82], to mention a few. 
Unlike the classical one controller control systems where the sequence of control 
implementation is not an issue, control systems with more than one controller have the additional 
complexity of designating whether the control actions are implemented simultaneously at the same 
time or whether there is a sequence by which the controls are implemented. The Nash approach 
[83], first introduced to the control literature in [84, 85], describes a situation where the control 
actions are implemented simultaneously and exactly at the same time.  Thus, no one controller has 
an advantage over the other in knowing ahead of time how the other controller reacts to its control 
actions.  Such an approach may result in an equilibrium that prohibits each controller from 
deviating from its control actions; simply because if such a deviation is taken, the outcome will be 
unfavorable to the controller exercising such an action. Another approach, known as the 
Stackelberg approach [86], first introduced into the control literature in [87, 88], describes a 
situation where one controller is more powerful than the other resulting in the control actions 
implemented according to a specific hierarchical sequence. The more powerful controller 
implements its control first and is assigned as the leader, and the other controller is then set as the 
follower. Such a hierarchy of decision making was first introduced in the 1950’s by Von 
Stackelberg[86] in the context of two firms making decisions about supplying a product into a 
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common market. The more powerful firm, which was labeled as the “leader”, decided on its 
production level first and the less powerful firm, which was labeled as the “follower”, followed by 
making its decision after knowing the production level of the leader firm. Since then, there has 
been considerable interest in the control literature in this hierarchical control structure for control 
systems with two controllers. [89, 90] Assuming that each controller has its own objective function 
that it wants to optimize, the question is how would the leader controller design its control so that 
when the follower controller follows, the final outcome will be favorable to the leader?  This 
question is very important to address whenever such a hierarchy in control design exists.   
1.3 Nash Control Solution 
The Nash rational in control has been studied by many researchers over the past fifty years 
or so [84, 85]. This type of multiple controller strategy has the property that no one controller will 
benefit by deviating from its agreed Nash control. The optimality is defined by assuming that both 
controllers know each other objective functions during their control design determination, and they 
are designed and implemented simultaneously.  
Suppose the objective function of controller 1 is ( )1 1 2,J u u  , and the objective function of 
controller 2 is ( )2 1 2,J u u  where u1 and u2 are the respective control functions of the two controllers 
and 
1U  2U  are the domains of these controls. The symbolical representation for deriving the Nash 




1 1 1 2 min ,
u U
u J u u





2 2 1 2 min ,
u U
u J u u

=     (1.2) 
Thus, both above equations yield to the Nash strategy inequality  
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 ( ) ( )* * *1 1 2 1 1 2, ,J u u J u u     (1.3) 
 ( ) ( )* * *2 1 2 2 1 2, ,J u u J u u     (1.4) 
These inequalities assure each controller that the other controller has no incentive to deviate 
from its Nah control because if it does, it will only be hurting its own objective function.  In this 
sense, the Nash controls provide an equilibrium situation for both controllers.  
The necessary condition for the Nash open-loop solutions for both controllers is illustrated 
in the following  
1.3.1 Nash Open-Loop Solution in Dynamic Systems  
 
Consider two controllers 
1C  and 2C , responsible for finding the controls 1u  and 2u , 
respectively, in which these control variables are continuous functions on the interval 0 , ft t   . The 
two-controller differential system with state equation  
( ) ( )1 2 0 0, , , ,          x f x u u t x t x= =     (1.5) 
and controller 1 has its own objective function  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
0




J u u K x t L x u u t dt= +      (1.6) 
and for controller 2 the objective function is  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
0




J u u K x t L x u u t dt= +      (1.7) 
Where 0x  is the initial state known by both controllers, and, 1 1u U  and 2 2u U   0 , ft t t    , 
where 0 , ft t   is the fixed time-horizon.  
Depending on the structure of the information for both controllers, such as open-loop structure. 
Hence, the controls depend on the time and initial state 0x , ( )1 1 0,u u t x=  and ( )2 2 0,u u t x=   
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To derive the necessary condition for such systems implementing their controls using the Nash 
strategy, both act simultaneously. In other words, 
1C  picks 1u  and 2C  picks 2u  , at the same time. 
Where the pair ( )1 2 1 2,u u U U  . 
The Hamiltonian function for 
1C  and 2C  are as follow:  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2, , , , , , , , ,H x u u t L x u u t f x u u = +     (1.8) 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2, , , , , , , , ,H x u u t L x u u t f x u u = +     (1.9) 
Where ( )1 1 t = and ( )2 2 t =  are costate variables for 1C  and .Thus, the necessary conditions 
for 
1C  and 2C  are addressed below: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2 0 0
1 2
, , , ,                                            
H H
x f x u u t x t x
 
 
= = = =
 
                                  (1.10) 




11 1 2 1 21
1 1 1
, , , , ,
,                   
K x TL x u u t f x u uH
T
x x x x T
  
 
= − = − − =
   
                 (1.11) 




22 1 2 1 22
2 2 2
, , , , ,
,                 
K x TL x u u t f x u uH
T
x x x x T
  
 
= − = − − =
   




1 1 1 2
1
ˆmin , , , 0
u U
H









2 2 1 2
2
ˆmin , , , 0
u U
H





                                                                                        (1.14)   
 
These are the necessary conditions for the open-loop Nash strategy nonzero-sum differential 
system. Notice that these equations have mixed boundary where the state equation has a known 
initial state, while the costate equations have the terminal costate values with solving these three 
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differential equations with two algebraic equations (stationary conditions 4 and 5) yield to 
determine the open-loop Nash equilibrium. However, solving such an equation in general not easy 
to solve. Though for some application of linear state variable and quadratic objective function can 
be solved analytically, most of them must are solved numerically.  
1.4 Stackelberg Control Startegy  
The Stackelberg control option is based on one controller having the capability to design 
its controller first, due to its size or faster means of information processing and refers to it as a 
“leader” [87, 88]. Thus, the Stackelberg solution of the two-controller nonzero-sum solution is 
based on assuming these two-controller systems are different in their roles in such the control 
systems are designed hierarchically. Therefore, a controller is called a leader, and the other 
controller is referred to as a follower. The follower follows the leader's strategy in which the leader 
announces his strategy first, and the follower determines his controller according to the leader’s 
announced strategy. The leader foresees and effectively dominate the entire controls determination 
process 
Let 
1U  and 2U be the controller 1and controller 2 admissible sets, respectively, and in turn, 
if their corresponding objective functions are
1 1 2( , )J u u and 2 1 2( , )J u u , where the 1 1u U . and 
2 2u U  Now if controller 2 is assigned to be the leader and supposed there is exist a mapping such 
that 
2 1:T U U→  such that  
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1, ,          J Tu u J u u u U        (1.15) 
For every 2 2u U  , then as a rational reaction from controller 1, the follower, the following set  
( ) 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2, : ,D u u U U u Tu u U=   =        (1.16) 
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is called the rational reaction set for controller 1 when controller 2 is the leader. Moreover, if there 
is a pair ( )1 2 2 2 1,S Su u D  such that1  
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1, ,          ,S SJ u u J u u u u D       (1.17) 
 
Where ( )1 2 2 2,S Su u is called a Stackelberg strategy pair when the controller is the leader. Hence, 
the same process is done when controller 1 is the leader with a change of the indices. The rational 
reaction is set for controller 2, which is now the follower, denoted by 
2D  and the pair 
( )1 1 2 1 2,S Su u D . For the above approach, it is clear that the intersection for both the rational 
reaction sets 
2lD D  , then the common pair ( )1 2,N Nu u is the Nash solution of the two-controller 
system. In this case: if controller 2 is the leader, ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2, ,S S N NJ u u J u u similarly if controller 
1is the leader ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2, ,S S N NJ u u J u u . 
1.4.1 Stackelberg Open-Loop Solution in Dynamic Systems  
 
The necessary conditions for the existence of the Stackelberg open-loop control can be 
obtained based on the Stackelberg solution is obtained in the hierarchical scheme. For instance, 
assume the leader 
2C   and announce his strategy first, which leaves controller 1, the follower, with 
no choice just to solve his problem by considering the leader’s announcement. 
1.4.2 For the Following controller  
 
 The Hamiltonian function for the follower, Controller, 1C   
 
1 where the subscription beside the controls index;𝑆2 , the letter S=Stackelberg and number 2 is when the leader is controller  
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( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2, , , , , , , , ,H x u u t L x u u t f x u u = +  
The necessary condition for the follower is as follow: 
( ) ( )1 1 2 0 0
1
, , , ,                                       
H





                                                                     (1.18) 




11 1 2 1 21
1 1 1
, , , , , ,
,         
K x TL x u u t f x u u tH
T
x x x x T
  
 
= − = − − =
   




1 1 1 2
1
ˆ0 min , , ,
u U
H





                                                                                           (1.20) 
And from the latter condition, there is a reaction for the follower, and for each possible 
action from the leader, there is a reaction from the follower then ( )( )*1 1 2ˆu u u t= .  
1.4.3 For the Leading controller  
 
Now, the leader must face two constrains to optimize his objective function, the state 
dynamic equation and the co-state dynamic condition for the follower  
The constructed Hamiltonian function for the leader 
2C becomes as shown in equation (1.21):   
 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )* *1 1 2 2 1 2 2* *
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
*
2 1 2 2 2
, , , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
L x u u u t f x u u u t
L x u u u t f x u u u
x x











        (1.21) 
Where 2 ,   are the costate variables of the leading controller. Thus, the necessary conditions for 
the leading controller are 
( )( ) ( )*2 1 2 2 0 0
2
, , , ,                                                      
H





                              (1.22) 
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1 1 2 2 1 2 2 12
1 1 1
, , , , , ,
,         
L x u u u t f x u u u t K x TH
T




= = − − =
   
              (1.22) 
And the costate differential equations are derived as follow: 




, , , , , , , , , , ,L x u u u t f x u u u L x u u u t f x u u u t




   
= − − + +
   
 
= −  
   
  









K x T K x T
T T
x T x T
 
  
= −  
   







,                                                         0 0





 = − = =
   
 
               (1.24) 




2 2 1 2 2
2
0 min , , ,
u U
H





                                                                                 (1.25) 
Again, the resulting conditions consider as a two-boundary point problem, and solving such a 
problem, in general, is not easy in general. In this dissertation, the solution is obtained for some 
illustrative examples, depending on the system's type, numerically, and analytically. 
The optimal control of systems governed by multiple controllers rather than one controller 
leads to many questions that need to be addressed.  This dissertation addresses the Nash and 
Stackelberg strategies to construct solutions for such problems. More specifically, the 
implementation of the feedback controls in sample data form is addressed. 
In the open-loop control design for multiple controller systems, the design control needs 
only for the state vector's initial state and will be a function of time as well. The other option is the 
closed-loop control option, in which the measurements of the state vector in each instance of time 
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must be available. This requirement for designing a closed-loop may be expensive, and in some 
cases, not possible. The dissertation's proposed method is that the sampled closed loop and the 
samples are pre-specified and equally distributed. In each sample of this proposed approach, the 
control is designed in its open-loop scheme, and thus the whole interval is represented by these 
open-loop controls. This type of control is sampled closed-loop, which is a trade-off between the 
simplicity of designing a single open-loop and reap the advantage of the feedback closed-loop. 
Remarkably, the more samples, the sampled closed loop is approaching to continuous closed loop 
on the Nash control design. For the Stackelberg, increasing the samples leads to the sampled 
closed-loop approaching the continuous Nash closed loop. 
The Stackelberg option is a Leader-Follower approach in which there is a leader controller 
who announces his strategy first, and the other controller is a follower. However, if these roles are 
predetermined, this option can be in mutual agreement: when both realize that they are better off 
with the agreed leader’s selection, the other is selected as a leader. The other possible situation is 
when both prefer to be leaders or both followers. In this dissertation, we suggest when the 
parameter uncertainty, the role selection option availability is dependent on the parameters space 
over which the system is defined. In this dissertation, we define the partitioning of the parameter 
space to classify the ability and availability of the design of the Stackelberg implementation or not. 




1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into four main chapters. Chapter one is an introductory 
chapter with a general review of the optimal control problem and its natural extension to the 
multiple controllers' problem, each with its designated own objective functions. Chapter two 
proposes a new method to reap the advantage of the closed-loop properties by designing a less-
costly and straightforward controller for multi-controller systems, which needs fewer amounts of 
state vector measurements. In chapter three, we discuss a significant property for Leader-Follower 
Stackelberg systems, which is so little explored, and we try to give attention to the importance of 
the leadership role with possible changing of the system parameters.  Chapter four applies multi-
controller multi-objective systems in dynamic microeconomic systems where two firms are 
maximizing profits by controlling their production outputs. Finally, we conclude this dissertation 
and suggest new paths for future research in chapter five. 
 
   
14 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
SAMPLED CLOSED-LOOP 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we consider control systems controlled by multiple controllers, each having 
its own objective function.  The Nash and leader-follower Stackelberg options for designing the 
controls are considered.  These control options are heavily used as decision options in the non-
zero-sum differential solution theory.  To reap many of the benefits of feedback, the resulting 
designs are best implemented as closed-loop controls. However, closed-loop controls require 
continuous measurements of the system’s state vector, which may be expensive or even impossible 
in many cases.  As an alternative, in this chapter, we consider a sampled closed-loop 
implementation.  Such an implementation requires the state-vector measurements only at pre-
specified instants of time and hence is much more practical and cost-effective compared to the 
continuous closed-loop implementation. We derive the necessary conditions for the general linear-
quadratic problem, develop the Nash's solutions, and Stackelberg controls in detail for the scalar 
case.  An example of a control system with two controllers and state measurements available at 
integer multiples of 10% of the total control interval is presented to illustrate the results. 
2.2 Motivation 
The multi-controller multi-objective control systems theory deals with control systems 
whose state variables are controlled by two or more independent controllers, each trying to 
minimize its own objective function.  Systems of this type occur in many applications in smart 
energy buildings [60], load frequency control, and automatic voltage regulation in power systems 
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[48, 91], biomedical systems [27], to mention a few. Unlike single controller problems where 
optimality is easily defined in minimizing one objective function, defining what optimality means 
in multi-controller multi-objective problems is much more complicated.  Since the state variables, 
and consequently the objective functions, depending on all controllers' control action, defining 
optimality must be done in terms of the choice of controls as implemented by all controllers 
simultaneously and collectively.  The principle of optimality in these systems is defined in terms 
of the rationale assumed by each controller in determining its control variables.  Several d ifferent 
rationales, leading to different definitions of optimality, have been explored in the past several 
decades, mainly within differential solution theory. 
The Nash rationale [83], first introduced to the control literature in [84], describes a non-
cooperative situation in which each controller’s control rationale is to safeguard itself against 
attempts by any other controller from further improving its objective by deviating from its agreed 
Nash control.  This concept of optimality assumes that all controllers know each other’s objective 
functions and that when the controls have been determined, they are all determined and 
implemented simultaneously at the same time.  Another concept, which has proven to be very 
useful in two-controller systems, is the Stackelberg rationale [86].  This concept, first introduced 
to the control literature in [27], also describes a non-cooperative situation except that due to size, 
importance, or faster means of information processing, one controller can arrive and implement its 
control actions before the other.  The controller that can implement its control first is referred to 
as the “leader” and the other as the “follower.”  Thus, the Stackelberg solution is based on a 
hierarchy of control decision-making and is very powerful in deriving optimal controls for the 
leader controller that would benefit it due to the timing advantage over the follower controller.  
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Whether the controllers in a multi-control system are applying Nash or Stackelberg 
controls, they always must make an additional decision on how their controls are to be 
implemented in practice.  As is well known in single controller problems, control variables can be 
implemented in either open-loop or closed-loop form.  The open-loop form is simpler to implement 
in that it only requires knowledge by all controllers of the state variables' initial conditions. It 
represents control functions of time that do not depend on the evolution of the state of the system 
and hence cannot be adjusted if system parameters drift from their nominal values or unknown 
nonlinear distortions occur at any time during the implementation of the control.  On the other 
hand, the closed-loop form is more complex to implement in that it requires knowledge of the state 
vector at every instant of time during implementation, thus necessitating the placement of sensors 
or filters at critical locations of the system to provide measurements of the state variables.  This 
form has a clear advantage [92] over the open-loop form in that should any small perturbations 
occur is the system’s parameters, or should any unknown distortions occur, the state variables 
would change accordingly, causing an adjustment in the control variables to keep the state 
variables as close as possible to their prescribed optimal trajectories.   Such an adjustment would 
not occur in the open-loop implementation because the control variables are completely unaware 
of the system's state once the system is past its initial state. 
An added complication in multi-controller systems, which does not exist in single 
controller systems, is that the open-loop and closed-loop controls are different and produce 
different state trajectories even under ideal conditions [27, 48]. Because the state variable may or 
may not be available to the other controllers for implementation, making the design of the control 
variables for each controller completely different and dependent on the information structure 
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available to the controllers; thus, the controllers must decide whether they would be implementing 
open-loop or closed-loop controls prior to determining their control variables.  This decision is 
very important and must be communicated or known to all the controllers in the system.  
Furthermore, the controllers must accept and implement the same control structure used in the 
controls' design process.  Some controllers' option using open-loop and others using closed-loop 
is also possible; however, simplicity will not be considered in this chapter. 
One of the main issues that may deter the controllers from implementing closed -loop 
controls is cost.  Clearly, the placement of sensors, or measurement devices, to measure the state 
variables continuously over time and transmitting that information to the controllers at every 
instant of time is a very costly process and in some cases may even be impossible due to the 
environment in which the state variables are measured.  For example, in a metal forming process, 
the high temperatures of the environment around the state variables (could be greater than 800o F) 
may prevent the possibility of permanently placing sensors in that environment.  Instead, a less 
costly and more practical option could be to measure the state variables at pre-specified instants 
of time [93], which may or may not necessarily be uniformly distributed over the interval of 
optimization.  The controllers would then implement closed-loop controls only at the instants when 
measurements are obtained and implement open-loop controls following those instants until the 
next instant when measurement becomes available again.  The design of such controllers would 
be an intermediate option between the open-loop and continuous closed-loop options. The fewer 
the measurement samples would produce controls that are closer to the open-loop option, and the 
larger the number of measurement samples would produce controls that are closer to the 
continuous closed-loop option. We will refer to this control structure as a sampled-closed-loop. In 
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this chapter, we will investigate the implementation of this new control structure in the case of 
linear quadratic multi-controller systems. Without loss of generality and for simplicity of notation, 
we will consider only the case of two controllers. Almost all the results derived in this chapter can 
be easily extended to the case of M-controller systems where M > 2.  Furthermore, in the case of 
the Stackelberg controls, without loss of generality, we will only consider the case where controller 
2 is the leader controller.  The results can be easily duplicated for the case where controller 1 is 
the leader. 
2.3 Linear Quadratic Multi-Controller Systems. 
Linear quadratic systems are a very important class of control systems for which optimal 
controllers can be easily derived analytically [1].  A linear-quadratic two-controller system is a 
control system described by the linear differential equation: 
 
1 1 2 2 0 0,    ( )=x  x Ax Bu B u x t= + +     (2.1) 
where x is the state vector, 1u is the control vector of controller 1, and 2u  is the control 
vector of controller 2. The objective functions for the two controllers are quadratic in the form: 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
1 1







J u u x C x x Q x u R u dt  = + +     (2.2) 
and 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1







J u u x C x x Q x u R u dt  = + +     (2.3) 
respectively, where all matrices are symmetric and of proper dimensions and  and are 
positive definite matrices. Controller 1 wants to minimize 1J , while controller 2 wants to minimize
2J . Defining the following matrices  and , it is known [84] that the open-
loop Nash controls for this problem are of the form: 
1R 2R
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1 1 1 1E B R B






1 1 1 1( ) ( , )
N
o ou t R B K t t x
− = −     (2.4) 
  
and    1
2 2 2 2( ) ( , )
N
o ou t R B K t t x
− = −      (2.5) 
 
where , , and satisfy the coupled differential equations: 
 
1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( , ),        ( , )o o o ot t A E K E K t t t t I  = − − =     (2.6) 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1,      ( )fK A K K A Q K E K K E K K t C= − − − + + =     (2.7) 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2,       ( )fK A K K A Q K E K K E K K t C= − − − + + =    (2.8) 
 
It is also known [88] that the open-loop Stackelberg controls with controller 2 as the leader 
is of the form: 
 2 1
1 1 1 1( ) ( , )
S
o ou t R B S t t x
− = −     (2.9) 
 
and 2 12 2 2 2( ) ( , )
S
o ou t R B S t t x
− = −     (2.10) 
Where 0( , )t t , 1( )S t , and 2 ( )S t  satisfy the coupled differential equations:  
1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( , )              ( , )o o o ot t A E S E S t t t t I  = − − =     (2.11) 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1,       ( )fS A S S A Q S E S S E S S t C= − − − + + =     (2.12) 
 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1,      ( ) ( )f fS A S S A Q Q P S E S S E S S t C C P t= − − − + + + = −    (2.13) 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2                   ( ) 0oP AP PA PE S PE S E S P t= − + + + =     (2.14) 
 
( , )ot t 1( )K t 2( )K t
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Note that equations (2.9)-(2.11) are very similar to equations (2.5)-(2.7) except that 
equation (3.11) has the extra term 
1Q P in it that depends on the solution of the linear equation in 
(2.12).   
In both cases, the values of the objective functions when either the Nash or Stackelberg 











o o oJ x M t x=     (2.16) 
where  and  satisfy the linear differential equations: 
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ,  ( )fM A E L E L M M A E L E L Q L E L M t C = − − − − − − − − =   (2.17) 
 
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ,     ( )
f
M A E L E L M M A E L E L Q L E L M t C = − − − − − − − − =   (2.18) 
 
Where 
1 2 and L L  are replaced by 1 2 and K K from equations (2.6) and (2.7) in the case of 
the Nash controls and are replaced by 
1 2 and S S from equations (2.10) and (2.11) in the case of the 
Stackelberg controls.  
2.4 Implementation of the Sampled Closed-Loop Controls 
 To simplify the notation, we will now illustrate these controls' implementation on 
a scalar linear-quadratic system.  The extension to higher dimensionality systems can be easily 
done in a very similar way.  Consider the two-controller scalar system: 
1 1 2 2 , [ , ),    ( ) is given o f ox ax b u b u t t t x t= + +      (2.19) 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1







J t c x t q x ru dt= + +     (2.20) 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1







J t c x t q x r u dt= + +     (2.21) 
1( )M t 2 ( )M t
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Let us now assume that measurements of the state vector can be obtained at discrete pre -
specified instants of time 
1 1, , ,o nt t t − such 1 1o n ft t t t−    and which may or may not be 
uniformly distributed over the interval [ , )o ft t . Starting at the interval 1[ , )n ft t−  and proceeding 
backward in time until the first interval 
1[ , )ot t is reached, we will solve for the controls successively 
as described below. Assume that at instant  the state vector  can is available for 
measurement by both controllers who will then design and implement sampled closed -loop 
controls of the form
1( , ( ))iu t x t  and 2( , ( ))iu t x t over the interval .  The system equation 
over this interval   is: 
1 1 2 2 1, [ , ),      ( ) available i i ix ax bu b u t t t x t+= + +      (2.22) 
and 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 1







J t m t x t q x ru dt+ +
+
= + +     (2.23) 
2 2 2
2 2 1 1 2 2 2
11 1







J t m t x t q x r u dt+ +
+
= + +     (2.24) 
The Nash controls over the interval are obtained from (2.4) and (2.5) -(2.7) and 
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    (2.25) 
Where, assuming that   and , we have   
 
1 1 2 2( ) ,       ( ) 1ia e k e k t  = − − =     (2.26) 
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 12 ,       ( ) ( )i ik ak q e k e k k k t m t+ += − − + + =     (2.27) 
2
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 12 ,        ( ) ( )i ik ak q e k e k k k t m t+ += − − + + =     (2.28) 
it ( )ix t
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1( )k t  
and
2( )k t  are determined from the above equations, the values of the objective 
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2
i i iJ t m t x t=     (2.30) 
 
Where 
1( )m t and 2( )m t satisfy the linear differential equations obtained (2.17) and(2.18):  
2 1
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 12( ) ,      ( ) ( )
i i
i im a e k e k m q e k m t m t
+
+= − − − − − =     (2.31) 
 
2 1
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 22( ) ,  ( ) ( )
i i
i im a e k e k m q e k m t m t
+
+= − − − − − =     (2.32) 
 
We can follow a similar procedure for the Stackelberg controls. For the interval 
1[ , )i it t t +  









( , ( )) ( )






u t x t s x t
r
b










    (2.33) 
Where:                         1 1 2 2( ) ,     (0) 1a e s e s  = − − =     (2.34) 
2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 12 ,      ( ) ( )i is as q e s e s s s t m t+ += − − + + =     (2.35a) 
 
2
2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 12 ,        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i is as q q p e s e s s s t m t m t p t+ + + += − − + + + = −    (2.35b) 
 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2( ) , ( ) 0ip e s e s p e s p t= + + =     (2.36) 
Once 1( )s t  and 2( )s t  are determined from the above equations, the values of the objective 
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where and satisfy the linear differential equations obtained from (2.17) and 
(2.8):  
2 1
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 12( ) ,       ( ) ( )
i i
i im a e s e s m q e s m t m t
+




2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 22( ) ,         ( ) ( )
i i
i im a e s e s m q e s m t m t
+
+= − − − − − =     (2.39) 
 
As mentioned earlier, for both the Nash and Stackelberg controls, the process starts at the 
last interval of time 1[ , )n ft t−  where the boundary conditions at ft t=  






proceeds backward in time until the interval 
1[ , )ot t is reached. We will now illustrate the derivation 
of the Nash and Stackelberg controls for the following two-controller control system. 
2.5 An Illustrative Example 
 Consider the following two-controller system: 
 
 
1 2 , [0,1), (0) 1x x u u t x= + −  =     (2.40) 
 
Let the objective function of controller 1 be: 




(1) (2 ( ) ( ))
2
J x x t u t dt= + +     (2.41) 







2 (1) ( 4 ( ) 3 ( ))
2
J x x t u t dt= − + − +     (2.42) 
1( )m t 2( )m t
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With the coefficients multiplying 2x being positive in 1J and negative in 2J , clearly 
minimizing these objective functions represents a situation where controller 1 is trying to drive the 
state variable x towards the origin (i.e., regulate the system) while controller 2 is trying to drive it 
away from the origin (i.e., destabilize the system).  The interval of control is [0,1] . We will 
consider the case of sampled-closed-loop control, where only ten state vector measurements are 
available 0.1( 1),for 1, ,10it n n= − = . Comparing (2.40)-(2.42) with (2.19)-(2.21) the system 
parameters are
1 21, 1and 1a b b= = = − , the parameters for controller 1 are 1 1 2c q= = and 1 1r = , 
the parameters for controller 2 are 
2 2 4c q= = − , and 2 3r = .  Following (2.25), the Nash controls 
for this system are
1 1( , ( )) ( )
N
i iu t x t k x t= − and 2 2( , ( )) 1/ 3 ( )
N
i iu t x t k x t= . Similarly, following 
(2.33) the Stackelberg controls with controller 2 as a leader are 
1 1( , ( )) ( )
S
i iu t x t s x t= − and
2 2( , ( )) 1/ 3 ( )i i
su t x t s x t= .   Plots of all solution variables for this problem are shown in Figures 
(2.1) through (2.8). Figures (2.1) and (2.2) show plots of the feedback gains for both the Nash and 
Stackelberg controls.  These are plotted as a pair on the same graph to illustrate the difference 
between the two solutions.  While 1 1and k s  having the same boundary condition at t=1,    2 2and k s
have different boundary conditions due to the p(t) variable in (3.33), which is plotted versus time 




Figure (2.1): Plots of 
1( )k t and 1( )s t vs. time 
 
Figure (2.2): Plots of 




Figure (2.3): Plot of ( )p t for the Stackelberg control vs. time 
 
Plots of the parameters 1( )m t and 2( )m t  which characterize the objective functions are 
shown in Figures (2.4) and (2.5), and plots of the controls and state trajectories are shown in 
Figures (2.6)-(2.8), respectively. Clearly, the state variable's trajectory is approaching the origin, 
which means it has been regulated.  This result indicates that controller1 has been able to 
accomplish its objective in spite of the fact that controller 2 was trying to drive the state away from 
the origin. Plots of the objective functions' values 1J and 2J for both the Nash and Stackelberg 
controls are shown in Figures (2.9) and (2.10).   It is clear from Figure (2.10) that 2 2
S NJ J at every 
[0,1]t which means, as expected, that the leader in the Stackelberg solution (controller 2 in this 




Figure (2.4): plots of 
1( )m t vs. time 
 
Figure (2.5): Plots of 




Figure (2.6): Plots of the Nash and Stackelberg controls for controller 1 vs. time. 
 





















Figure (2.10): Plots of controller 2 cost-to-go (Nash and the Stackelberg) vs. time. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have considered systems that are controlled by more than one controller, 
each having its own objective function.  The optimal control of such systems does not simply 
involve minimizing the objective functions, but it also involves how the various controllers interact 
with each other and how they take the controls of the other controllers into account.  In this chapter, 
we have considered the Nash and Stackelberg control rationales.  These solution concepts are very 
popular in the context of dynamic solutions.  We have considered the special case of linear 
quadratic systems with two controllers and derived and solved in detail all the accompanying 
necessary differential equations for the scalar case.  We then considered the implementation of 
sampled closed-loop controls.  These controls are closed-loop types expect that the feedback loops 
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are closed only at specific instants of time when the state-vector is available for measurement.   We 





LEADERSHIP SELECTION WITH PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY 
 
In leader-follower Stackelberg games, the leader determines and announces its strategy first 
by anticipating the follower’s reaction function, and the follower determines its strategy as the best 
response to the leader’s strategy. Thus, there is a perceived advantage in assuming the role of a 
leader in a Stackelberg game. When the controllers' roles are not determined a propri, both 
controllers must mutually agree on the selection of the leader.  Such an agreement is possible only 
if the controllers realize that they are both better off with the agreed selection of leader than when 
the other controller is selected as leader.  In games with parameter uncertainty, th is option's 
availability depends on the parameter space over which the game is defined.  This chapter describes 
the partitioning of the parameter space to characterize when a Stackelberg solution based on an 
agreed leader selection exists and when it does not. The resulting partition can then be used to 
determine the probability of all possible games where agreement can and cannot be reached. We 
illustrate the results using two examples. 
3.1 Introduction 
The Stackelberg solution [86-88] in two-player nonzero-sum static and dynamic games 
provides an alternative to the Nash solution [83-85] when the two players' roles can be defined as 
leader and follower.  The leader in a Stackelberg game decides on its strategy first, and the follower 
determines its strategy as the best response to the leader’s strategy. The Nash and Stackelberg 
solutions have received considerable attention in both the multiple controller's literature over the 
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past 50 years or so.  The recent books [94] by Basar and Olsder, [95] Yong, [90]Ungureanu , and 
[96] Lambertini provide a very good summary and include most of the relevant references related 
to these two solutions. One of the main advantages of the Stackelberg solution, as was demonstrated 
in [88] and [97], is that the Stackelberg solution is advantageous over the Nash solution for the 
leader.  A controller is always better off being a leader in a Stackelberg game than an equal 
controller in the Nash game.  Hence, as expected, both controllers will compete for the leadership 
role either by acquiring faster means of decision-making or by trying to become dominant in size.  
In doing so, however, each controller has ignored considering the possibility that being a follower 
might be a more beneficial option to it than being a leader.  While this would not be possible in a 
duopoly with two profit-maximizing firms, Hou et al [98], it is a highly probable outcome in two-
player games in general.  To illustrate this point let us first consider the simple 2- controller matrix 
game is shown in Figure (3.1), where each controller has three decision choices.  controller 
1C  
decides on the x variables and wants to minimize its payoff consisting of the first entries in the 
matrix and controller 
2C  decides on the y variables and wants to minimize its payoff consisting of 
the second entries in the matrix.  The Stackelberg Solution with 1C  as leader is 2 3{ , }x y yielding 
payoffs of (3, 4) and the Stackelberg Solution with P2 as leader is 
1 1{ , }x y yielding payoffs of  
(4, 7). Clearly, in this case, both controllers will do better when P1 is the leader and would therefore 










Figure (3.1): A Matrix Example 
 
In games where the leader's selection is negotiable, each of the two controllers will need to 
compare the outcome of the games when it plays the role of leader and when it agrees for the other 
controller to play the role of leader.  Thus, there are four possible options for the controllers to 
consider. Two options occur when each controller determines that it is preferable for it to be a leader 
while simultaneously, the other determines that it is preferable for it to be a follower. These two 
latter options are implementable since, in each case, the controllers can reach a mutual agreement 
on the selection of the leader.  A third option occurs when each controller determines that it is 
preferable for it to be a leader and for the other controller to be a follower, and a fourth option 
occurs when each controller determines that it is preferable for the other controller to be a leader 
and for it to be a follower. Clearly, neither of these last two options is implementable since the 
controllers cannot mutually agree on the leader's selection, and a stalemate will prevail. The 
deadlock can be resolved either by the controllers adopting a Nash approach or by one controller 
considering making side payments to the other controller as an incentive to agree to be a follower.   
The possibility of distributing the roles in a Stackelberg game was first mentioned in [99] Basar in 
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and [101] Dowrick in the context of static duopoly problems where it is agreed that even in the 
competitive framework between two firms in a duopoly, it is not unreasonable to expect that they 
may end up coordinating the distribution of their roles as leader and follower in a mutually 
advantageous way. Later on, [102]Van Damme and Hurkens argued that committing to the role of 
leadership is less risky for the low-cost firm so that such a firm will emerge as a leader is a 
Stackelberg duopoly. In a more recent paper, [103] Liu questioned whether a leader firm in a 
duopoly really has a strategic advantage in practice under demand uncertainty.  The paper cites 
several examples of market leaders in the dotcom era that ended up not sustaining the business due 
to uncertainty in demand. Another recent paper [104] Nie, Wand, and Cui argue that in repeated 
games, controllers acting as leaders, in turn, improves cooperation and consequently enhances 
social welfare.   
While most of the early applications of the Stackelberg strategy were in duopoly type 
economic problems, in recent years, there has been an emergence of interest in the Stackelberg 
solution as an effective mechanism for analyzing many of today’s complex engineering systems.   
These include the smart electric grids [105-108], wireless communication systems [109, 110], 
cyber-physical systems [111, 112], and others. The Stackelberg solution has also been of interest in 
problems related to security resource allocation [113], artificial intelligence  [114, 115], economics, 
management, and marketing systems [116-118], and others.  Many of these complex systems do 
not have a naturally designated leader leaving the leadership position open for negotiation.  The 
selection of a leader becomes a very important issue that will affect the entire system's performance.  
Selecting or negotiating who should be the leader in these systems becomes very important, 
especially when it is not obvious that being a leader is always advantageous.  
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In this chapter, we explore the partitioning of the parameter space to characterize the 
various regions when the controllers can mutually agree, and when they do not, on the selection of 
the game leader. If the parameters probability distribution is known, the resulting partition of the 
parameter space can then be used to determine the probability of all possible options of leader 
selection. We illustrate the results with two examples where the parameters are uniformly 
distributed over a bounded space and show how the probabilities of the existence of either 
controller's mutually acceptable selection as a leader can be determined. 
3.2 Stackelberg Solutions with Uncertain Parameters: 
In Stackelberg games defined over a space of uncertain parameters where the leader is to 
be selected by mutual agreement, the challenge is to determine probabilities of occurrence of a 
game where it is advantageous for each of the two controllers to be select as the leader. To 
accomplish this, the regions in the parameter space that delineate when it is advantageous for each 
controller to be selected as a leader need to be determined.  Let Ω be the space of uncertain game 
parameters, and let , 1, 2Li i   =  be the set of parameters such that the controller i  prefers
2 [119] 
to be the leader and F L
i i = −   be the set of parameters such that the Controller i  prefers to be 
a follower. Then Ω can be divided into two regions: (1) A region of Agreement, ΩA, representing 
parameters that characterize Stackelberg solutions where both controllers agree on the leader 
selection, and a region of disagreement, ΩD, representing parameters that characterize Stackelberg 
solutions where both controllers cannot agree on the leader selection. The region of agreement ΩA 
 
2 The preference can be either based on a cardinal ranking of the choices available to each player according to an 
objective function or on an ordinal raking of the choices based on each players’ subjective preference 
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consists of two feasible sub-regions 
A1 1 2
L F =    representing the region where both 
controllers agree that controller 1 should be selected as the leader and 
A2 1 2
F L =  represent 
the region where both controllers agree that controller 2 should be selected.  Similarly, ΩD can be 
divided into two sub-regions: 
DL 1 2
L L =   representing solutions where both controllers 
disagree in that both want to be selected as leaders and 
DF 1 2
F F =  where both controllers 
disagree in that both want the other controller to be selected as leader. Characterizing these regions 
in the parameter space will not only provide information about solutions where the leader 
selections by mutual agreement are possible but also will allow for a determination of the 
probabilities of occurrence of each of these solutions. Such probabilities will help the controllers 
decide a priori on the most advantageous selection of the leader between them. 
To clarify these concepts, let us first consider the simple 2-controller matrix solution shown 
in Figure (3.1), where each controller has three decision choices. The controller 1C   controls the x 
variables and wants to minimize the first entry in the matrix, and the controller 
2C   controls the y 
variables and wants to minimize the second entry in the matrix.  The solution has two uncertain 
parameters  and   in the matrix entries that are uniformly distributed over the bounded region
{( , ) such that 0 8 and 0 12}   =     . Following [99], it can be easily shown that the 
Stackelberg solution with controller 1, 1C  as a leader, always occurs at the location 2 3{ , }x y , and 
the Stackelberg solution with controller 2,
2C , as a leader, always occurs at the location 1 1{ , }x y  
for all ( , )   .  Furthermore, it can be easily shown, as illustrated in Figure (3.2), that: 
 
1) 




A2 {( , )  such that 0 3 and7 12}    =       
3) 
1 {( , )  such that 3 8 and 7 12}D     =       
4) 
2 {( , )  such that 0 3 and 0 7}D     =       
The four regions and their probabilities of occurrence of corresponding solutions are 
indicated in Figure (3.2).  Clearly, the largest region in the parameter space is the region of 
agreement
A  implying that there is a 36% probability that a solution will occur where both 
controllers agree that should be selected as leader and 16% probability that a solution will occur 
where both agree that 
2C  be selected as to be the leader. These are both feasible Stackelberg 
solutions by mutual agreement. Figure (3.2) also indicates that there is a 48% probability that a 
solution will occur where an agreement is not possible with a 26% probability due to both 
controllers want to be selected as leaders and 22% probability due to neither controller wants to 
be selected as leader. This simple example illustrates the importance of determining the regions in 









Figure (3.2): Matrix example with variables of 𝛼, 𝛽 
 1y  2y  3y  
1
x  , 7  6,16  7, 5  
2
x  9, 14  11,13  3,  
3




Figure (3.3): Characterization of the Parameter Space Ω for the solution in figure (3.2) 
 
3.3 Differential Solution example 
 Consider the first-order linear-quadratic differential game example described by 
the linear differential equation: 
1 2 0 , [0,1] , and (0)x u u t x x= −  =      (3.1) 




1 1 2 1 1
0
1 1
( , ) (1) ( )
2 2 p
J u u c x u t dt
c








( , ) (1) ( )
2 2 e
J u u c x u t dt
c
= +    (3.3) 
where x  is the state variable, 
1 2 and u u  are the control variables of Controllers 1C  and 2C  
respectively and 1J  2J are their respective cost functions. This classic simple example was first 
considered in [120] Ho, Bryson, and Baron (1965) and has been used since then as a benchmark 
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example to illustrate numerous solution concepts in differential game theory.  Note that
1J and 2J
include the scalars parameters
1 2, , , and p ec c c c , which for the problem to be well defined, must 
satisfy the conditions: 
1 2{ 0, 0, 0, 0}p ec c c c          (3.4) 
If the value of these parameters were known a priori, then it will be possible to determine 
whether or not both controllers can agree on who should be selected as leader. Using the notation 
isju and 1 2( , )i sj sjJ u u , or simply
j
iJ , to denote the Stackelberg strategy and corresponding cost for 
controller i when controller j is leader, then both controller s will agree for controller 1 to be selected 
leader if 1 2
1 1J J  and 
1 2
2 2J J  both will agree for controller 2 to be selected leader if 
2 1
1 1J J  and
2 1
2 2J J . In this chapter, we will assume that the parameters 1 2, , , and p ec c c c are uncertain, and as 
a result, it is not possible to determine a priori whether a leader selection is feasible or not. To  the 
simplicity of notation, let us define the parameters  
1 2, , , and p ec c c c       (3.5) 
To determine the regions of agreement ΩA and disagreement ΩD, we first need to determine 
the set of parameters 21 2{ , }a a R  over which the two Stackelberg solutions with either controller 
as leader exist.  It follows (from Eqs. (48)-(53) in [88] ) that the open-loop Stackelberg solution 
with P1 as leader exists provided 2










+ +  
                                                                        (3.6) 
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    (3.8) 
Similarly, the open-loop Stackelberg solution with P2 as the leader exists provide
2







a a + + 
+  
   (3.9) 
The control variables for this solution are: 




















































  (3.11) 
Thus, the parameter space 2R over which both Stackelberg solutions exist is: 
 2 2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1{ , } 0, 0, (1 ) 0, (1 ) 0, (1 ) 0, and (1 ) 0a a R a a a a a a a a =     +  +  + +  + +   
Figure (3.3) shows the region Ω in R2. Note that the reason the coordinate axes correspond 
to 1 0a =  and 2 0a =  are shown as dotted lines is that these lines are not included as a part of Ω. 
Next, we need to determine the region of agreement A   . As mentioned earlier, ΩA 
consists of two sub-regions
A1 1 2
L F =   where both controllers agree that 1C  should be selected 
as the leader and 
A2 1 2
F L =  where both controllers agree that 2C  it should be selected as 
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leader.  The region 
1
L is determined by the set of parameters that yield 1 21 1J J . Using (3.8) and 
(3.11), this means that:  
 





2 1 1 2
(1 )
[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]
c c a
a a a a
+

+ + + +
   (3.12) 
After numerous algebraic manipulations, the above inequality reduces to: 
 4 2 2 3 21 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2(1 ) 2 (1 ) ((1 ) [(1 ) 2 ] 0c a a a a a a a a+ + + + − + + + +     (3.13) 
and after additional manipulations, it reduces further to: 
 
 2 2 31 2 1 2 2 2 12 (1 ) (2 )(1 ) 0c a a a a a a+ + − + +      (3.14) 
and finally, after more manipulations, it simplifies to 
2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 12 (1 ) ((2 ) (1 ) ) 0c a a a c a a a a− + − + + +     (3.15) 
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Dividing the above inequality by the expression 2 2
1 1 2 1(1 )c a a a+ which is > 0 since 
2













   (3.16) 
Now, if 
2 0a   (i.e., if 2 0c  ) then the above inequality (4.16) will always be satisfied when
1 2{ , }a a  . If 2 0a  then (4.16) must also be satisfied to characterize 1
L .  Thus, in summary, the 
set of parameters for which 
1C  prefers to be the leader is: 
( ) 11 1 2 2 2 2
2 1
(2 )2
{ , }  0  or 0 and 1 0  
(1 )
L aa a a a
a a
  + 
 =     + +   
+   
 (3.17) 
and the set of parameters for which C1 prefers to be a follower is 
1 1
F L = − .  Figure (3.4) 
illustrates the division of   into 1
L and 1
F .  
Now following a similar derivation, the set 
2
L  such that 2 12 2J J  can be determined as: 
( ) 22 1 2 1 12
1 2
(2 )2
{ , } 0  or 1 0 if 0  
(1 )
L aa a a a
a a
  + 
 =    + +    
+   
   (3.18) 
and 
2 2
F L = − .  Figure (3.5) illustrates the division of   into 2
L and 2
F . The 
superposition of Figures (3.4) and (3.5) when   it is bounded by 1 2  and a A a A   and 2A=  is 
shown in Figure (3.6).  This figure shows the two regions of agreement ( A1 and A2 ) and the 
two regions of disagreement ( D1 and D2 ). It is interesting to note that the feasible region is now 
divided into eight separate regions (labeled I through VIII for ease of referencing) that are related 




Figure (3.5): Regions 
1
L and 1
F  in Ω 
 
1) A1  It consists of sub-regions I and II, where both agree that 1C   should be selected as a leader. 
2) 
A2 It consists of sub-regions III and IV, where both agree that 2C  should be selected as a 
leader. 
3) D1 It consists of sub-regions V, VI, and VII, where both disagree, each preferring itself to be 
selected as a leader. 
4) 
D2 It consists of sub-region VIII, where both disagree, each preferring the other controller to 




A1 and A2 each consists of a large and a small region that is disconnected,  
while 
D1 consists of three disconnected regions with VII being dominant in size, indicating that 
most solutions would result in each controller wanting itself to be selected as leader. 
 
 
Figure (3.6): Regions 
2
L and 2
F  in Ω 
 
When the upper bound A of the parameters 
1 2 and a a changes, some of the above 
observations will change accordingly.  For example, when A=0 (i.e., when   is bounded by 




D2 being the most dominant indicating a strong preference for solutions where both 
controllers prefer the other controller be selected as leader. 
Finally, solutions that correspond to parameters in the small regions (e.g., II and IV) are 
very sensitive to small perturbations in the parameters causing a wrong potential distribution of 
roles for the controllers.  
 
 





3.4 Probabilities of Occurrence 
Assuming that the parameters 
1 2 and a a are uniformly distributed over,   as shown in 
Figure (3.3) with A as upper bounds 
1 2 and a a , we can calculate the probabilities of occurrence of 
solutions where both agreement and disagreement occur.   The total area of the region Ω in Figure 
(3.4) can be determined analytically as a function of A by direct integration to be equal to 




+ − = + + . Tables (3.1) and (3.2) list the areas calculated by direct 
integration for each of the various regions in figure (3.6) for three different values of A.  These 
tables also show the probability of occurrence of solutions corresponding to all sub-regions 
individually as well as to the cumulative regions representing agreement and disagreement.  
 
Table (3.1): Probabilities of Occurrence of all individual Sub-regions within   
Type of 
Solution 
Region Area of Region   Probability of Occurrence 










=  A=1 A=2 
A1  
I 0.0 0.5227 0.9047 1.9047 0.0% 27.20% 27.39% 22.94% 
II 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 17.34% 2.74% 1.59% 0.63% 
A2  
III 0.0 0.5227 0.9047 1.9047 0.0% 27.20% 27.39% 22.94% 
IV 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 17.34% 2.74% 1.59% 0.63% 
D1  
V 0.0 0.3820 1.0000 4.00000 0.0% 19.88% 30.27% 48.17% 
VI 0.0 0.0953 0.0953 0.0953 0.0% 4.96% 2.89% 1.15% 
VII 0.0 0.0953 0.0953 0.0953 0.0% 4.96% 2.89% 1.15% 
D2  VIII 0.1981 0.1981 0.1981 0.1981 65.32% 10.32% 5.99% 2.39% 
Total Area 0.3033 1.9213 3.3033 8.3033  
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Table (3.2): Cumulative Probabilities of Occurrence of Agreement/Disagreement Regions 











=  A=1 A=2 
A1  0.0526 0.5753 0.9573 1.9573 17.34% 29.94% 28.98% 23.57% 
A2  0.0526 0.5753 0.9573 1.9573 17.34% 29.94% 28.98% 23.57% 
D1  0.0 0.5726 1.1906 4.1906 0.0% 29.80% 36.05% 50.47% 
D2  0.1981 0.1981 0.1981 0.1981 65.32% 10.32% 5.99% 2.39% 
Area 0.3033 1.9213 3.3033 8.3033  
 
Clearly, for a large parameters space (A=2), the dominant region with the highest overall 
probability of occurrence is 
D1 .  This means that there is a 50.47% probability that both 
controllers will end up disagreeing that 
1C  should be selected as a leader. This probability, 
however, decreases rapidly to 36.05% as the parameter space becomes smaller (A=1) and to 0% 
as space becomes even smaller (A=0-).  The probability of occurrence of an agreement-solution 
A1 or A2 is 0% when A=0
-, becomes equal to the probability of disagreement D1 at about 30% 





= then increases to 28.98% when A=1 and then 
dropping substantially to 23.57% when A=2.  Clearly, the highest probability of agreement (at 





= and the highest probability of disagreement (at 65.32%) occurs 
when A=0-.  The size of the parameter space is clearly the determining factor of whether a mutual 
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agreement can be reached 
1D →between the two controllers.  Note that if A→ then and the 
probability of disagreement with each controller wanting to be the leader will approach 100%. 
3.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, we have explored the problem of selecting the leader in Stackelberg 
games with uncertain parameters.  We have shown that the parameter space can be divided into 
four regions, two of which representing games in which mutual agreement can be reached on the 
selection of leader and the other two representing games in which disagreement between the 
controllers takes place with both controllers either wanting to be leaders or both preferring to be 
followers. A leader's selection can be easily accomplished if the game parameters fall within the 
region of agreement. However, if they do not, then a stalemate condition may prevail, and the 
selection of a leader becomes more complicated. The Nash solution or the possibility of side 
payments may become options to break the stalemate.  The probabilities of occurrence of 
agreement and disagreement games are very useful information for the controllers to use in the 
process of negotiations.  We have illustrated these concepts with two examples and showed how 
the probabilities of occurrence of all games are determined when the parameters are uniformly 
distributed over a bounded space. This chapter provides an illustration of the type of analysis that 
needs to be performed on all Stackelberg games defined over uncertain parameters where the 





ECONOMIC APPLICATION: DUOPOLIST CASE 
This chapter is devoted to the important application of multiple controllers with multiple 
objective systems in economics. We consider the real case when there are two-firm that control 
the dynamics of a demand function. We derive the necessary condition for Leader-Follower-Firm 
economic Stackelberg control systems. The general results are not easy to solve. In this work we 
proposed the novel demand linear differential state function with quadratic cost functions. 
However, the presence of cross term in the integrating profits function. The derivation of the 
necessary conditions for such systems are presented in this chapter. To demonstrate the important 
of the proposed model, the results, simulation results are presented for the numerical example. 
4.1 Problem Description 
A control system with two controllers, one labeled as a leader whose control is ( ),Lu t and 
the other labeled as follower whose control is ( ),Fu t which is typically described by the differential 
equation over an interval of time [0, ]T  of the form: 
( )
( ( ), ( ), ( ))L F
dx t
x f x t u t u t
dt
= =                 (4.1) 
where ( )x t  is the state variable. For simplicity of notation and without loss of generality, 
we will consider only scalar systems, although most of the derivations can easily be extended to 
higher dimensions. We will assume that the two controllers have two different discounted 
objective functions (profits) that they wish to maximize:  
 
0
( , ) ( , , )
T
rt
L L F L L FJ u u e L x u u dt





( , ) ( , , )
T
rt
F L F F L FJ u u e L x u u dt
−=      (4.3) 
Where 
rte− is the discounted factor, and r is the discounted rate for both firms. 
To best describe the Stackelberg Leader-Follower control design process, we will consider 
a specific model of a dynamic economic system of two controlling firms.  This model describes 
two firms controlling a common dynamically evolving market through their product supply 
functions.  The model that we will consider assumes that the product price x(t) (i.e. , state variable) 
depends on the total product supply ( ) ( ) ( )L Fu t u t u t= + where ( )Lu t is the leader supply control 
and ( )Fu t is the follower supply control according to the differential equation: 
( )
( ( ), ( ) ( ))L F
dx t
x f x t u t u t
dt
= = +     (4.4) 
 
This relationship essentially implies that at any instant of time, the product price depends 
on the total supply according to: 
0
0
( ) ( ( ), ( ) ( ))
t
L Fx t x f x u u d   = + +     (4.5) 
Where 0x is the initial price at some arbitrary initial time 0 0t = . Furthermore, we shall 
assume that the objective of each firm is to maximize its profits over the time horizon [0, ]T  , which 
are now described as: 
 
0
( , ) [ ( )].
T
rt
L L F L L LJ u u e xu C u dt




( , ) [ ( )].
T
rt
F L F F F FJ u u e xu C u dt
−= −     (4.7) 
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where the term ( )I I Ixu C u−  represents the difference between the revenues Ixu  and 
production costs ( )I IC u for firms   and I L F= . In this dynamic control model, the supply 
control functions are determined continuously as a function of time to maximize the profits over 
the specified time horizon. 
The Stackelberg control of the leader is first determined as a function of the control of the 
follower.  To do this, the leader controller must anticipate the follower's maximization problem 
(4.7) for every possible leader control to arrive at its control function. This is accomplished by the 
follower controller using a standard optimal control methodology[1, 121-124]. The Hamiltonian 
for the follower is defined (consider the discount factor for both firms is 0r =  ) as: 
 ( ) ( , )F F F F F L FH xu C u f x u u= − + +     (4.8) 
and the necessary conditions for the follower’s control function are [27]: 
( , )
, ( ) 0L FF F F F





= − − =

    (4.9) 
     
( ) ( , )
0 F L FF
F F







    (4.10) 
Where
F is the follower’s Lagrange-multiplier. Thus, for every possible control Lu that the 
leader can implement, the follower will determine its control 
Fu by solving (4.9) and (4.10) where 
and Fx H satisfy (4.4) and (4.8).  These expressions, therefore, define how the follower reacts to 
every possible control choice by the leader.  Now the problem faced by the leader is a little more 
complex.  The leader must determine its control Lu that maximizes (4.6) subject to the constraint 
that 
Fu  satisfies the differential equation (4.9), and the algebraic equation (4.10) can be solved 
implicitly for the follower’s control as a function of x and the leader’s control Lu  ; that is, 
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( , )F F Lu u u x= .  Then, the leader’s control can be determined using a different leader’s 
Hamiltonian defined as: 
( , ( , ))
( ) ( , ( , ))+ ( , ) L F LL L L L L L F L L F L F
F
f x u u u x




= − + + − − 
 
 (4.11) 




( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )
                                                        + ,       ( ) 0
L F L F F F L F





f x u u f x u u u u f x u u
x u x x u x
f x u u u
u T
u x
   

   +  +    +
= − + + +  




   (4.12) 
( , )
, (0) 0L L FL L L
F F





= − = =
 
       (4.13) 
2 2
2
( ) ( , ) ( , )
  0
( , ) ( , )
                                      
L L L L F L F F
L
L L L F L
F L F L F F
L
L F L F L
H C u f x u u f x u u u
x
u u u u u
u f x u u f x u u u
u u u u u


    +  + 
= = − + + 
     
   +  + 
− + + 
     
   (4.14) 
These expressions are, in general, very difficult to solve. However, like many of the 
optimal control problem, a solution can be determined analytically in the case where the system is 
linear and the cost functions are quadratic.  This will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
4.2 The Case of Linear Demand and Quadratic Cost Function 
The special case of one controller linear system and quadratic cost functions has received 
considerable interest in the control literature since the 1970s [122, 123]. As in the one controller 
case, considerable insight can be obtained about the system behavior by analyzing this special linear 





0( )           (0)L Fx ax b u u x x= − + =     (4.15) 
 Where a  and b  are positive constants and representing the rate of growth of the state 
variable when no control is applied.  Similarly, let the cost functions in (4.6) and (4.7) be quadratic 
of the form:  
2 21 1( ) and ( )
2 2
L L L L F F F FC u c u C u c u= =      (4.16) 
Where  and L Fc c are positive constants, and the factor ½ is introduced for mathematical 
convenience. It is clear from (1) that the two controllers can keep the state variable constant 
0x  
throughout the entire time horizon [87] if they both reach a consensus to simultaneously adjust their 
controls so that ( )L Fu u a b x+ = .  However, this is unlikely to happen since if one controller 
increases its control supply to increase its profits, the other controller will have to reduce its control 
to keep the consensus resulting in a reduction in its profits, which may not be acceptable.  In the 
dynamic model described in (4.15), both controllers will continuously adjust their controls in order 
to maximize their objective functions.  Thus, the follower’s maximization problem as described in 




F F F F F L FH xu c u ax b u u= − + − +     (4.17) 
As well as the following necessary conditions: 
 ( ) 0(0)L Fx ax b u u x x= − + =    (4.18) 
, ( ) 0F F F Fu a T  = − − =                                            (4.19) 
0 F F Fx c u b= − −   (4.20) 






= −     (4.21) 
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As a result, the problem faced by the leader is to maximize (4.7)subject to the two 
constraints: 
2
0( ) , (0)L F
F F
b b
x a x bu x x
c c









  = − − − =     (4.23) 
Derived from (4.18) and (4.19) by replacing 
Fu as described in (4.21).  The corresponding 
Hamiltonian (4.11) becomes: 
     
2
21 1( ) ( )
2
L L L L L L F L F
F F F F
b b b
H xu c u a x bu a x
c c c c
   
   
= − + − − + + − − −   
   
    (4.24) 
And the necessary conditions (4.12)-(4.14) reduce to: 
1





   = − − − + =     (4.25) 
2





   = − + − =     (4.26) 
0 L L Lx c u b= − −     (4.27) 






= −     (4.28) 
Now combining equations,(4.22)-(4.23) and (4.28) and replacing the controls 
Fu and Lu
with their expressions in (4.21) and (4.28), we get: 
2 2
0( ) (0)L F
L F L F
b b b b
x a x x x
c c c c
 = − − + + =     (4.29) 
1 1
( ) ,   ( ) 0L L L L
L F L F
b b
a x T
c c c c
   = − − − − + =     (4.30) 
 
1





  = − − − =     (4.31) 
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with β L  satisfying equations(4.26). Now, introducing the transformations L Lk x = , 
F Fk x = , and L kx = ; and after considerable mathematical manipulations, the solution of these 
equations yields the following control functions for the leader and follower respectively: 
( )( ) 0
1
( ) 1 ( )L L
L
u t bk t t x
c
= −     (4.32) 
( )( ) 0
1
( ) 1 ( )F F
F
u t bk t t x
c
= −     (4.33) 
where ( ), ( ), and ( )L Fk t k t t  are functions of time that satisfy the following differential 
equations: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
22 2 1 12 ( ) ,       ( ) 0L L L L F L
L F L F F L
b b b b
k t a k t k t k t k t k t k T
c c c c c c
 
= − + + − − + − = 
 
 (4.34) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
22 12 , 0 F F L F F F
L F L F F
b b b b
k t a k t k t k t k t k T
c c c c c
 
= − + + − − − = 
 
   (4.35) 
and where ( )k t  satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )                        (0) 0L F L
L L F F
b b b b
k t k t k t k t k t k t k
c c c c








 =  
where:   ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
L F
L L F F
b b b b
t a k t k t
c c c c

 
= − + − + 
 
    (4.37) 
At this point, we should mention that equations (4.34)-(4.36) are a two-point boundary value 
problem consisting of coupled nonlinear differential equations. Equations (4.34) and (4.35) have 
boundary conditions at the terminal time t=T, while equation (4.36) has a boundary condition at the 
initial time t=0. Once this system of equations is solved for ( )Lk t , ( )Fk t and ( )k t , only ( )Lk t and
( )Fk t are used to generate the function ( )t in (4.37), which in turn is used to calculate the function 
( )t . 
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4.3 Illustrative Example 
As an illustrative example, we consider a control system model of a dynamic market with 
two firms producing and selling the same product.  The model would  follow the differential 
equation (4.15) and profit functions as described in (4.6) and (4.7) with production costs as 
described in (4.16).  Let the problem parameters be defined as follows: 0.03a = , 0.012b = ,
0.60Lc =  and 0.70Fc = , and let the time horizon be such that 30T = . Assuming that the product 
has an initial unit price 
0 10x = , plots of the functions ( )Lk t  ( )Fk t , and ( )k t that satisfy (4.34)-
(4.36) are shown in Figures (4.1) and (4.2), respectively. Plots of the control functions ( )Lu t and 
( )Fu t  are shown in figure (4.3), and a plot of the state variable ( )x t , which represents the product 
price, is shown in Figure (4.4). The total profits accumulated by the firms in this case over the entire 
time horizon are 2,843.70LJ =  and 2, 471.31FJ =  indicating that the firm that has lower production 
costs has achieved higher profits 
Clearly, figure (4.3) shows that in the case of both firms, to maximize their profits, they 
must continuously increase production over the entire time horizon.  Also, it appears that the leader 
firm whose production cost is lower seems to be producing at a higher rate than the  follower firm 
whose production cost is higher. A close examination of the figure (4.4) reveals that the product 
price increases rapidly at the beginning but reaches a peak of almost 12 around t=20 before tapering 
down to 11.5 at t=30., the end of the profit maximization horizon. 
One interesting aspect of this analysis is to examine the profits of both firms and the product 
price as a function of the follower’s production cost. Table (4.1) and Figures (4.4-4.5) show the 
variations of the profits of both firms and the price behavior overtime when the Leader’s cost 
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parameter is fixed 0.60Lc =  , and the follower cost parameter Fc  is increased from 0.50 to 1.2. 
Clearly, as the follower's production costs increase, the product price increases and the follower’s 
profits decrease, but the leader’s profits increase.  Thus the leader has an incentive to ensure that 
the follower’s production costs remain as high as possible. In fact, when the follower’s production 
costs are double those of the leader, i.e. 1.20Fc = , the leader’s profits will be double the profits of 
the follower.  Table 1 also shows that, when 0.58128Fc = , both firms accomplish the same profits 
2,761.20L FJ J= = .  It is also interesting to note that the product price behavior as a function of 
time changes markedly as a function of 
Fc . The lower Fc , the more the price tends to reach a peak 
value. This peak value shifts to later in time as 
Fc  increases and vanishes when 1.00Fc = .  Beyond 
this value, the price becomes monotonically increasing in time.  This type of price behavior is 
interesting from the consumer point of view. A price that exhibits a peak followed by a drop after 
a certain time is more favorable to the consumer leading to the conclusion that the consumer prefers 
that the follower firm's production costs be more on par with the costs of the leading firm. In the 
next section, some results will be presented for the sensitivity of the parameters variation in the 




Figure (4.1): Plots of functions ( )Lk t and ( )Fk t  of equations(4.34) and (4.35) 
 




Figure (4.3): plots of ( )Lu t  and ( )Fu t  production rates 
 
Figure (4.4): plot of ( )x t  production price 
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Table (4.1): Profits of both firms as a function of 
Fc when 0.60Lc =  
Fc  LJ  FJ  
0.50 2708.14       3008.48 
0.52 2720.50          2943.00 
0.54 2733.40  2880.72 
0.56 2746.72         2821.38 
0.58 2760.32        2764.74 
0.58128 2761.20 2761.20 
0.6 2774.11 2710.58 
0.62 2788.02 2658.73 
0.64 2801.97 2609.01 
0.66 2815.93 2561.29 
0.68 2829.85 2515.43 
0.70 2843.70 2471.31 
1.00 3032.24 1963.00 





Figure (4.5): plot of ( )x t   when 0.6Lc =   and Fc  is increased from 0.50 to 1.20. 
4.4 Sensitivity with parameter variation of the demand function 
Following the results, we have gotten in chapter three and applied to  the proposed model 
and results of the duopolistic. If we suppose that uncertainty happen s in the demand function 
parameters, i.e., changing in a  and 𝑏.  
First, supposing there is an uncertain value of a  around its nominal value, with a fixed 
value of 𝑏, the plot in figure (4.6) shows proportional relations between the a  and both firms’ 
profits. Whereas 0.024a =  which is 80% from its nominal value 0.03a = , the leader firm will 
have profit 2298
L
J =   which is around 80%  from its profit when a  is nominal, and on another 
side, follower firm 1582FJ = which is 64.7%  almost the same percentage of losses. Thus, as the 
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value of a  going up to +20%, 𝑎 = 0.036 , the profits for leader and follower increased by +29% 
and+30% , respectively. 
 
Figure (4.6): Firms’ profits vs. a  fixed 0.012b = . 
 
The other possibility is that change in b ’s value with fixed a . If the variation 𝑏 is ranging 
as follow: { 20% 20%}− →+  from its nominal value, both firms' profits decrease as follows: 
Leader { 13 10%}+ →−  while the follower will change{ 13.5% 11%}+ →− . Figure (4.7) shows the 




Figure (4.7): Firms’ profits vs. b  and fixed 0.03a = . 
 
From the above two possibilities, both firms’ profits will increase as the value a  increases 
and decreases. As the final possible if  both parameters are varying 20% , the 3-dimensional plot 
in figure (4.8) shows the relationship as ( ),a b  pair are change and outcome leader firm profit LJ
. As expected from the previous results, the possible upper value of a  combined with the lowest 
possible of b  the best profit of leader firm within the range of variations and vice-versa. 
Numerically speaking, as shown from the figure (4.8) the lowest possible value for the leader profit 




Figure (4.8) Leader firm profits versus a  and b  variation 
 
For the same range of variations for the demand function parameters, the profits changes are 
represented by the surface, as shown in figure (4.9). The results can be shown for the lowest and 
best values of the follower profit as follow: ( 0.024, 0.0216) 1507FJ a b= = =  and best possible 




Figure (4.9): Follower firm profits versus a  and b  variation 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we considered control systems controlled by two independent controllers.  
Motivated by real problems in dynamic economics where more powerful big firms can implement 
their production strategies before the less powerful small firms, the leader-follower structure as a 
variation of the traditional control systems has attracted considerable attention in recent years. In 
such systems, due to either size or power, one controller has an advantage over the other in that it 
is capable of designing and implementing its control actions before the other.  This controller is 
referred to as the leader controller and the other as the follower controller. To take advantage of the 
leadership role, the leader controller anticipates the follower controller's reaction and designs its 
control actions taking this reaction into account as a constraint that needs to be satisfied. This makes 
the design process of the leader control much more complicated than the follower control design. 
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Once the leader’s control is designed and imp lemented, the follower control is traditionally 
designed as an optimal one controller control. In this chapter, we have examined the design process 
of both controllers in detail, and we have shown that the leader implicitly determines the best 
follower’s control that optimizes its performance and designs its control taking into account that the 
follower’s optimal choice is that specific control.  These types of leader-follower control systems 
can be used to describe many practical control systems. An illustrative example and simulation 
results are presented to demonstrate the our proposed differential demand function with using 




CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
The control of multi-controller multi-objective systems presented in this dissertation is 
considered a natural extension of the standard optimal control theory. In this dissertation, we have 
discussed properties and applications related to these types of systems. The focus of the 
dissertation is on dynamic systems with two controllers, each having its own objective function to 
minimize over a finite-horizon. The contributions of the dissertation are summarized below. 
5.1 Contributions 
5.1.1 Sampled closed-loop  
 
Chapter two proposed a sampled, instead of continuous, closed-loop schemes for two-
controller multi-objective systems. The necessary conditions for the proposed approach are 
derived in detail for Linear Quadratic (LQ) systems. The theoretical results and implementation of 
the sampled closed loop controls are applied for both Nash, and Stackelberg approaches.  The main 
consideration of this approach is in designing the controls, which is a trade-off between the 
simplicity of implementation of the   open-loop framework and the robustness property of the 
closed-loop framework. The proposed scheme can be a special type of feedback loops that are 
closed only at specific instants of time when the state-vector is available for measurement.  As an 
application for the derived results, we have illustrated a two-controller example for both the Nash 
and Stackelberg solutions where the time horizon is divided into several number of samples.  
Several observations can be made as a result of this example. For the Nash controllers it was 
observed that as the number of samples increased, the system's behaviors for both controllers and 
state trajectory resemble the behavior of the continuous closed loop.  However, the sampled-
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closed-loop Stackelberg implemented controller with a high rate of samples approached the Nash 
continuous closed-loop controls, and state trajectory.  
 
5.1.2 Chosen Roles with Parameters uncertainty   
 
Chapter four is devoted to an application of two controller systems in economics, the 
duopoly model. This model is a linear differential price equation while the profit functions include 
quadratic costs. In this chapter, we presented an illustrative example and derived the necessary 
conditions for the leader-follower Stackelberg approach.  One can conclude that the solution does 
not exist for all possible ranges of cost parameters.  
 
5.1.3 Economic Application: Duopolist Case 
 
Chapter four is devoted to one important application in economic, the duopoly case. The literature 
for two-firm shares the same market and produces the same good and control the demand function 
is mostly static. However, this dissertation tries to consider the price as controlled by a differential 
equation from a control system view. The proposed model is new and has not been considered in 
previous literature. This model is a linear differential price equation while the profit functions are 
quadratic cost and have a cross term. However, due to the fact that the Nash controller’s derivation 
is more straightforward than the Stackelberg controller, the Nash case is not considered in this 
work.  An illustrative example is presented to apply the necessary derived conditions for such 
systems using the leader-follower Stackelberg approach.  One can conclude that the solution does 
not exist for all possible ranges of cost parameters.  
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5.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
There are several interesting problems that have not been   explored in this dissertation and 
remain open for future research.  An important problem is to extend the sampled closed loop 
approach to multiple controllers in nonlinear systems.  Another problem is generalizing the leader-
follower role assignment over system parameters distribution for more general models including 
linear quadratic systems.  Exploring the possible solutions when both controllers are in 
disagreement would also be interesting.  
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